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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - TRIAL BY JURY - RIGHT TO wAIVE PRESENCE OF TRIAL JUDGE - Defendant was tried for the crime of driving a
car while intoxicated. After the jury was instructed and had retired, the judge
who had supervised the trial up to that point announced that he was going to
another town to sit for a judge who was in poor health, but that a second judge
would be available to receive the jury's verdict. Defendant's counsel failed to
object to these arrangements. After the judge who heard the cause had left,
the jury desired further instructions. As defendant objected to this request,
however, it was denied. The second judge received the unqualified verdict of
the jury convicting defendant. On appeal, held, affirming the conviction, that
defendant had waived his constitutional and statutory rights to have the same
judge preside over the entire trial and to have that judge give further instructions to the jury. Having waived his rights, defendant must affirmatively show
prejudice resulting from these irregularities in procedure to establish reversible
error. State v. Sereg, (Iowa, 1941) 296 N. W. 231.
At common law, among the substantial elements of trial by jury were:
(I) a jury of exactly twelve men, ( 2) presence of a supervising judge with
powers to instruct and advise the jury on the law and facts, and (3) a unanimous jury verdict.1 Most of the criminal cases involving waiver of the right
to trial by jury have been concerned with the first essential. The leading case
of Patton v. United States 2 held that under the Federal Constitution trial by
jury is a right and priVJ1ege of the defendant in a criminal case, misdemeanor or
felony, and that a jury of twelve men may be waived entirely by the defendant.
Interpreting the specific language of applicable provisions of state constitutions 8
and statutes, most state courts have drawn distinctions, allowing waiver of a
jury in trials for misdemeanors 4 but not for felonies, 5 or allowing waiver of
1

Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253 (1929). The second
essential was dealt with in Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 19 S. Ct. 580
{1899). A superintending judge is not required merely to perform the functions of
assembling the jury, administering oaths, entering judgment, and sentencing the
defendant; he is to exercise the highly important functions of instructing the jury on
the law, advising on the facts, and setting aside a verdict of guilty if against the law or
evidence.
2
281 U.S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253 (1929). The policy argument that the defendant
should not be able to waive a jury trial because of the state's interest in preserving the
liberties of its citizens seems specious in view of the fact that the defendant may
ordinarily dispense with a jury trial by pleading guilty. 28 I U. S. 276 at 308. Cf.
also principal case, 296 N. W. 231 at 236.
3
Typical of the provisions in state constitutions is that in the Iowa Constitution,
Bill of Rights, art. I, § 9 ( I 8 57), providing: "The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. • • ." Section IO provides that the "accused shall have a right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury••••" In State v. Hataway, 153 La. 751, 96 So.
556 (1923), it was held that defendant could not waive a constitutional provision
requiring a jury of five, and consent to trial by a jury of twelve.
4
70 A. L. R. 279 at 288 (1931). Holding that a jury cannot be waived in trial
for a· misdemeanor is Cleghorn v. State, 22 Ala. App. 439, II6 So. 510 (1928).
When trial by jury cannot be waived, the theory of the courts generally is that the
constitutional or statutory requirements are jurisdictional. Cf. Commonwealth v. Rowe,
257 Mass. 172, 153 N. E. 537 (1926).
5
70 A. L. R. 279 at 282 (1931).
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one juror 6 but not the entire jury/ As to the third element, unanimity in the
jury's verdict, although there seems to be a paucity of cases on the point, it has
been suggested that there is no apparent reason why the accused should not be
allowed to waive this right. 8 Such a result would certainly be in accord with the
breadth of the Patton decision, which seems to be determining the trend of state
court holdings on the nature of the elements of trial by jury.9 In the principal
case, the second element of trial by jury was involved. Iowa had already held
that the defendant could not waive a jury entirely in a criminal case; 10 but
the court had ample precedent for holding that other statutory and constitutional
rights and privileges can be waived.11 A decision that a substituted judge may
receive the verdict of the jury seems likewise to be in accord with the holding
of the Patton case and, holdings in various state jurisdictions.12 Although the
practice of substituting judges is not to be commended,18 it would seem that in
cases of necessity judges might be substituted, at least before trial has actually
6
State v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa 578, 2 N. W. 275 (1879); Commonwealth ex rel.
Ross v. Egan, 281 Pa. 251, 126 A. 488 (1924); State v. Sackett, 39 Minn. 69, 38
N. W. 773 (1888). Contra, Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128 (1858).
7
State v. Carman, 63 Iowa 130, 18 N. W. 691 (1884); State v. Williams, 195
Iowa 374, 191 N. W. 790 (1923); Commonwealth v. Hall, 291 Pa. 341, 140 A.
626 (1928). Holding that a jury may be waived completely are State ex rel. Warner
v. Baer, 103 Ohio St. 585, 134 N. E. 786 (1921); Jennings v. State, 134 Wis. 307,
ll4 N. W. 492 (1908).
8
RorncHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 789 (1939).
9
State ex rel. Kortgaard v. Patterson, 66 N. D. 555, 267 N. W. 438 (1936).
The effect of the Patton case in Illinois is seen in People ex rel. v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250,
172 N. E. 722 (1930), overthrowing Harris v. People, 128 Ill. 585, 21 N. E.
563 (1889), and holding that a jury may be waived in a criminal case. Much of the
weight of the Patton case is due to the holding that defendant's waiver of jury trial
must be consented to by government's counsel and sanctioned by the court. 28 l U. S.
276 at 312. Cf. State v. Sackett, 39 Minn. 69, 38 N. W. 773 (1888); People v.
Scornavache, 347 Ill. 403, 179 N. E. 909 (1931); United States v. Dubrin, (C. C. A.
2d, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 499, noted in 26 GEo. L. J. 762 (1938).
10
State v. Carman, 63 Iowa 130, 18 N. W. 691 (1884).
11 In the principal case, the court cites Iowa cases which allowed defendant to
waive: (1) the constitutional right of confrontation by witnesses, (2) the statutory right
that jurors be able to read and write English, (3) the statutory requirement that only
one grand juror should be drawn from any one township, (4) the statutory requirement of a certain number of grand jurors, (5) the statutory requirements relating to
proper argument before a jury. 296 N. W. 231 at 236-237.
12 Fuson v. Commonwealth, II Ky. L. Rep. 412, 12 S. W. 263 (1889); King
v. People, 87 Colo. II, 285 P. 157 (1930). In Freeman v. United States, (C. C. A.
2d, 1915) 227 F. 732 at 759, the court said that trial by jury in a criminal case means
trial before a tribunal "consisting of at least one judge and twelve jurors, all of whom
must remain identical from the beginning to the end," and that neither the defendant
nor the government can consent to substitution of judge or jurors. The Patton case
changes the complexion of this holding completely. In England, at common law, judgment could be entered or execution ordered only by the judge who tried the case.
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 328 Pa. 27 at 30, 195 A. II5 (1937).
13 State v. Sereg, (Iowa, 1941) 296 N. W. 231 at 238.
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begun or after the jury has retired, without creating reversible error by such
act alone. 14 If the integrity of the trial is preserved and the defendant is not
actually prejudiced, he should not be entitled to secure a reversal on appeal,
particularly when he does not object to the substitution. It is arguable that in the
principal case prejudice to the defendant's cause should have been presumed because the jury did not receive the additional instructions it requested.15 To
hold, as the court does, that the defendant, by his objection, prevented return
of the jury, and that the jury's request might have been inconsequential or the
substitute judge's instructions relative thereto entirely adequate, is to ignore what
defendant's position would have been had he refrained from objecting. But as
the defendant did not object to the substitution of judges when the jury went
out, it seems that the instant case reached a conclusion which is in accord with
the recent trend of authorities to the effect that the elements of trial by jury
are rights of the defendant which may be waived.
Robert P. Kneeland

H Commonwealth v. Thompson, 328 Pa. 27, 195 A. 115 (1937). In State v.
McCray, 189 Iowa 1239, 179 N. W. 627 (1920), it was held that defendant might
consent to a change of judges in the middle of the trial, where the second judge had
familiarized himself with the record. Contra, Blend v. People, 41 N. Y. 604
(1870); Commonwealth v. Claney, II3 Pa. Super. 439, 173 A. 840 (1934).
In King v. United States, (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) 25 F. (2d) 242, it was held
that where the trial judge died after the verdict was received, his successor was competent to pass on a motion for new trial and allow a bill of exceptions. Cf. also
People v. Kasem, 230 Mich. 278, 203 N. W. 135 (1925).
15 In State v. Carman, 63 Iowa 130, 18 N. W. 691 (1884), the court's holding
that defendant could not waive a jury entirely was based largely on a statutory provision of the criminal code that an "issue of fact must be tried by a jury of the county
in which the indictment is found." In the instant case, the statutory provisions in
question seem equally mandatory to the effect that if a jury desires information, it
"must require" the officer in charge to reconduct it to the court and that there the
"information required_ must be given as provided by law." Iowa Code ( 1939), § 13911.

